The two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) task is the workhorse of psychophysics, and is used to measure the just-noticeable difference (JND), generally assumed to accurately quantify sensory precision. However, this assumption is not true for all mechanisms of decision-making. Here we derive the behavioral predictions for two popular mechanisms, sampling and maximum a posteriori (MAP), and examine how they affect the outcome of the 2AFC task. These predictions are used in a combined visual 2AFC and estimation experiment. Our results strongly suggest that subjects use a MAP mechanism. Further, our derivations and experimental paradigm establish the already standard 2AFC task as a behavioral tool for measuring how humans make decisions under uncertainty.
Introduction
Virtually all our decisions are taken in the presence of uncertainty. For example, say we are choosing which check-out line at the grocery store to wait in. We have our past experience to inform us which lines usually move fast (prior beliefs). We also have our observations of the current situation -the number of people in each line -which give us an estimate of how fast each line will take (the likelihood). By combining these two pieces of information, a belief of which line is fastest (a posterior belief) can be formed. Many studies have shown, under a broad set of conditions, that people do combine a prior belief and a likelihood to make decisions under uncertainty. Though decisions like these are commonplace, exactly how the brain uses these posterior beliefs to choose between multiple uncertain options remains largely unknown. Several theories propose mechanisms by which the brain uses uncertain beliefs to make a choice.
In the check-out line example, our beliefs for each line are represented as a probability distribution over wait times. One theory proposes that the brain chooses the line whose most probable wait time is the shortest. This is the so-called maximizing or maximum a posteriori (MAP) choice (Green, 1966 ). An alternative theory proposes that the brain cannot compute the MAP, but can instead get samples from these believed waiting time distributions. By using many such samples, the brain can estimate the expected wait times for each line and make a choice. This is the so-called "sampling hypothesis" (Hoyer and Hyvarinen, 2003; Ackley et al., 1985) . Both MAP and sampling can be viewed as normative models of decision-making (Wozny et al., 2010; Vul et al., 2009; Sakai and Fukai, 2008b; Duda et al., 2012) , making either a viable candidate for how the brain makes decisions.
To examine decision-making, in a broad range of disciplines, studies have used one of the simplest decision tasks: the two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) task (Green, 1966) . In this task, subjects are asked to choose one of two possible options. For example, subjects may be asked which of two check-out lines is fastest, or which of two tones has a higher pitch, or which of two flashes of light displayed on a screen is further to the left. By controlling the discrepancy between these stimuli, experimenters can obtain a psychometric curve: the probability of a subject's response given the discrepancy between stimuli. This curve can then be used to measure the just-noticeable difference (JND), which quantifies how different the two stimuli must be before subjects reliably report them as distinct. As we demonstrate below, even though the 2AFC task has been the workhorse of psychophysics for the last 150 years (Green, 1966) , interpreting the JND relies on the still unknown mechanisms of decision-making.
Interestingly, the measured JND is almost always interpreted as characterizing sensory precision (e.g., Fetsch et al., 2011; Girshick et al., 2011; Tassinari et al., 2006; Ernst and Banks, 2002) and thought to be independent of an individual's prior beliefs. Depending on the mechanism of decision-making, however, the JND may or may not be influenced by a subject's prior, confounding the JND's interpretation. This confound raises concerns for the great number of studies that rely on the 2AFC task to measure sensory precision. Yet it also suggests that the JND's dependence on the prior could be used as a tool to probe the decision-making mechanism of the brain.
Here we derive the theoretical predictions for behavior in the 2AFC task for multiple mechanisms, including MAP and sampling. We demonstrate how only in the maximizing case is there no influence of the prior on the JND, in which case it correctly quantifies sensory uncertainty. We then exploit this result to design an experimental paradigm which measures JNDs as a function of prior uncertainty.
Using an interleaved estimation and 2AFC task, we measure subjects' prior beliefs and their JNDs.
We found that changes in a subject's prior had no measurable influence on their JND, consistent with MAP decision-making. Additionally, we establish a new use of the 2AFC task to probe the mechanisms of decision-making.
Materials and Methods

Theoretical prediction of psychometric curves
The 2AFC behavior is a two-stage decision process: the formation of a belief about the stimuli's values and a decision based on these beliefs ( Figure 1A) . Formally, the sensory information about the stimuli, the cues, induces a distribution over their possible values (i.e., a likelihood). Subjects form a belief (posterior distribution) in stimulus values by combining their prior expectations with the likelihoods. This Bayesian belief formation process is well supported by many studies (Vilares et al., 2012; Berniker et al., 2010; Kording and Wolpert, 2004; Ernst and Banks, 2002; Knill and Richards, 1996; Yuille and Bülthoff, 1994) . How subjects make a decision based on these beliefs is relatively less well established. Here we begin by formally defining the 2AFC task in terms of subject's beliefs, and then we mathematically examine the results under the assumption of two popular classes of decision-making. We highlight the differences between these decision-making mechanisms and how experiments might test for them.
Decision-making and the 2AFC task
In the 2AFC task (Green, 1966) , subjects make a binary choice based on two experimentally imposed stimuli, which we refer to as s 1 and s 2 . We denote the subject's response as z (z = 0 if false, z = 1 if true). By asking the subject to perform many trials while systematically manipulating the disparity δ = s 2 − s 1 , we can measure a psychometric curve, characterizing the probability of a subject's decision as a function of the disparity. As is standard, we fit this curve with the cumulative normal distribution:
where erf denotes the error function, and PSE is the probability of subjective equality: the subjective bias in stimulus disparity. One of the central measures obtained from fitting the psychometric curve is the just-noticeable-difference (JND), which quantifies how different the stimuli must be for subjects to reliably discriminate between them. Though the JND's definition varies slightly across studies, here we define it to be the best fit of σ JND to behavior. This JND is of central importance across much of psychophysics.
Due to experimental, sensory, and neural sources of noise, subjects cannot observe the true stimuli values s 1 and s 2 , but instead have to rely on noisy sensations of the cues, c 1 and c 2 .
Formally, our sensory information induces the likelihood of all possible values of the stimulus given the cue: P(c 1 |s 1 ) and P(c 2 |s 2 ). Subject's percepts can be thought of as a belief distribution over stimuli values given the cue, which we can describe as a posterior distribution, P(s|c). Applying
Bayes' formula, we have
where P(s) is the subject's prior expectation of stimulus values. Now we can formally interpret the 2AFC task as a decision, z, based on beliefs about the stimulus values, P(s 1 |c 1 ) and P(s 2 |c 2 ).
This allows us to predict different distributions, P(z|δ ), for different candidate decision-making "which coin is further to the left?"
Figure 1: The 2AFC task and decision-making. A) The 2AFC task is formalized by the formation of two beliefs and a subsequent decision using these beliefs. Sensory evidence (the likelihood) is combined with a prior to form a (posterior) belief in the stimulus's location. The decision is made by comparing these beliefs and making a binary choice (e.g. True or False). MAP and sampling are two proposed mechanisms for forming this choice. B) Psychometric curves predicted for the sampling and MAP mechanisms for a given likelihood. Two curves are shown for the narrow (NP) and wide (WP) prior beliefs for both MAP and sampling mechanisms. Note that the MAP-NP and MAP-WP curves overlap. The JND's for these four curves are also depicted. C) The JND of the psychometric curves as a function of the relative reliance on likelihood (an indicator of a subject's prior). Multiple curves are shown for sampling (with different number of samples, k).
mechanisms.
Maximum a posteriori (MAP) decision-making
According to the MAP hypothesis, subjects choose z to maximize the probability of being correct.
Mathematically, the choice is defined as follows:
Let us assume Gaussian distributions for the likelihoods, P(c 1 |s 1 ) = N (s 1 , σ 2 1 ), P(c 2 |s 2 ) = N (s 2 , σ 2 2 ) and the prior P(s) = N (µ, σ 2 s ), then we can rewrite the choice as follows:
where δ MAP is the difference between the expected posterior beliefs in the two stimuli:
Therefore, a subject's response is determined through the random variable, δ MAP , which is defined by the two random cues, c 1 , and c 2 . Next, using P(c 1 |s 1 ) and P(c 2 |s 2 ), we can integrate out c 1 and c 2 to obtain the probability distribution for δ MAP in terms of the two experimental variables,
Finally, we compute the probability of a subject's response.
The above equation defines the psychometric curve, the probability of the subject response given the experimentally manipulated stimuli. First we note a few important features of this curve.
In this general case, where the two sensed stimuli have different likelihoods, the psychometric curve is a function of the two stimuli, s 1 , s 2 , and cannot be rewritten in terms of their difference s 2 − s 1 ; that is, the psychometric curve is actually a surface. Also note that the point of subjective equality (PSE) is found when,
Therefore the PSE varies linearly with the stimulus positions, a fact we exploit to verify subjects are actually using their prior during experiments (explained below). The just-noticeable-difference (JND) is found to be,
If, however, the two likelihoods have the same variance, σ 1 = σ 2 = σ , then the psychometric curve collapses to the more familiar form defined by the difference of the two stimuli, δ :
To summarize, if subjects choose according to the MAP hypothesis then Equation 9 accurately models their behavior, whereas Equation 1 is used to fit their behavior. By comparing terms with Equation 1, we can define the experimentally derived JND in terms of the precision of a subject's likelihood:
This result is implicitly used by most studies that employ the 2AFC task to measure sensory uncertainty. If this assumption is true then the prior, indeed, has no influence on 2AFC behavior or the JND, making the approach particularly attractive ( Figure 1B ). However, as we demonstrate below, alternative decision-making mechanisms predict distinct results.
Sample-based decision-making
According to the sampling hypothesis, subjects choose based on approximations to the most probable stimulus values. This approximation is computed by "sampling" from the two posterior distributions, and comparing the averages of these samples. Mathematically, we can express the choice as follows:
wheres k 1 ands k 2 are the sample means computed by drawing k samples from the posterior distributions, P(s 1 |c 1 ) and P(s 2 |c 2 ); i.e.,s
where s 1i ∼ P(s 1 |s 1 ). Here again, if we assume Gaussian distributions for the likelihoods and prior we can rewrite the choice as follows:
where δ sample =s k 2 −s k 1 , is the random variable defined by the two random cues, c 1 , and c 2 , where
and P(s k 2 |c 2 ) is defined similarly. Just as with the MAP decision, we can integrate out c 1 and c 2 using the likelihoods P(c 1 |s 1 ) and P(c 2 |s 2 ) to obtain the probability distribution for δ sample in terms of the two experimental variables, s 1 , s 2 .
where the mean and variance are,
As with the MAP decision mechanism, the psychometric curve cannot be written in terms of the difference between s 1 , s 2 . The PSE is the same as in the MAP case (Equation 7). The JND is different, however, and given by,
Only when the two likelihoods have the same variance, σ , does the psychometric curve collapses to a form defined by the difference of the two stimuli, δ :
We note several features of this result, first of which is the appearance of the term from the prior, σ s . By matching terms with Equation 1, the experimentally derived JND is not merely a subject's sensory accuracy, but rather a combination of both sensory and prior uncertainties:
This result is in stark contrast with the traditional interpretation of the 2AFC task. We see that when a subject's prior is certain (relatively small σ s ), the JND increases ( Figure 1B ). In the limit of an infinite number of samples the JND under the sampling hypothesis is equivalent to the MAP prediction. In the case of a uniform prior (or more precisely, in the limit where the prior's variance tends to infinity), the JND is √ 2σ (k + 1)/k, a value distinct from the MAP prediction. Finally, note the special case where k = 1, which is the so-called matching hypothesis (Wozny et al., 2010; Vulkan, 2000) . Matching is equivalent to the scenario where subjects choose between their choices with a probability that is proportional to the probability of being correct; that is, z = 1 with probability P(s 2 > s 1 |c 2 , c 1 ) and a JND of:
These systematic differences between the MAP and sampling predictions (see also Table 1) suggest a way of using subjects' performance during a 2AFC task to investigate whether prior beliefs influence the measured JND. That is, we can use our results (Equations 10 and 20) to predict changes in the measured JND as a function of subject's priors (see Figure 1C ). Thus, this would be a useful tool for measuring the mechanism of decision-making.
Before moving on, it is worth noting that there are alternative interpretations for sampling.
Here we have proposed that subjects sample from the posterior belief over stimulus locations to compute a best estimate. This is sensible given that in our experiments subjects necessarily need to estimate the stimuli locations, either for estimating their positions or choosing which was further to the right (see Experimental Protocol below). However, it could be the case that subjects sample from their prior to compute the most likely estimate. Or, alternatively, subjects could sample from the posterior over the decision variable, z. We examined this latter hypothesis (see Appendix), and while there is no closed form expression for the resulting distribution analogous to Eq. 19, we found that this model's influence on the JND was nearly identical to that of our model. Additionally, subjects could have a prior belief different from the correct Gaussian distribution in our experiment (again, see Experimental Protocol). To this end we examined the influence of a uniform prior over stimuli locations. Here too we found nearly indistinguishable predictions from our Gaussian model (see Appendix). Thus we suggest the results we present here for sampling may be typical for alternative interpretations.
The PSE's dependence on prior beliefs
As we have shown above, when the likelihoods of the two stimuli have different standard deviations, the psychometric curve and the PSE are a function of both stimulus positions, not merely their difference. For both MAP and sampling mechanisms, the PSE changes linearly with the stimulus positions. The discrepancy s 2 − s 1 that results in P(z = 1|s 1 , s 2 ) = 0.5 is given by equation 7. From this equation, we can obtain a relationship between either stimulus value and the PSE. For example,
we can isolate the value of s 2 that corresponds to the PSE as
and then substitute this value to rewrite the PSE in terms of s 1 as follows
We see how this linear relationship changes with the variance of the prior, a useful prediction for verifying that subjects use their prior during the 2AFC task. We can exploit this relationship as a valuable control to verify subjects use their subjective prior during our 2AFC experiments (see below).
Experimental Protocol
Based on the findings presented above, we designed an experiment to examine whether or not subjects' behavior during a 2AFC task is influenced by their prior. If a change in their prior produces systematic changes in their JND, then this would be evidence that decisions are made with a sampling mechanism. If, on the other hand, the JND is invariant with respect to their prior, this would be evidence that subjects use a MAP mechanism. Perhaps of more practical importance, this would provide evidence that the 2AFC task measures sensory precision. To test this, we had subjects participate in a previously published "coin-catching" paradigm (Berniker et al., 2010; Vilares et al., 2012; Tassinari et al., 2006 ) that combined estimation and 2AFC tasks.
A virtual coin-catching paradigm was used to test subjects in both estimation and 2AFC tasks.
All trials/tasks began the same. The locations of two virtual coins were drawn from a normal distribution (the prior). The location of the first coin was depicted by quickly presenting a "splash"
(the likelihood) as five small red dots drawn from a normal distribution centered on the coin's position (see Figure 2) . After 25 milliseconds a mask (see below) was displayed for 500 milliseconds.
Then a second splash was used to depict the location of the second coin, again centered on the coin's location and displayed for 25 milliseconds and followed by a mask. After this, subjects were randomly asked to either estimate the second coin's location (the estimation task), or which of the two coins landed further to the right (the 2AFC task, see Figure 2 ).
In the estimation trials, subjects were presented with a virtual net, depicted with a vertical bar (2% of the screen width). Their task was to place the net where they believed the coin landed.
Since the net covered the entire height of the screen, the task was a one-dimensional estimation problem. Once they placed the net in the desired location and depressed the mouse key, the true coin location was displayed to them and the trial ended. If a coin landed within the net it was considered caught. A running tally of the number of coins caught as well as their average distance between the net and the coins was displayed. Thus the estimation trials changed the subject's prior belief in coin locations.
In the 2AFC trials, subjects were instructed to guess which tossed coin, unseen to them, landed further to the right by depressing a key, 1 for the first coin, and 2 for the second. The data collected during the 2AFC trials was used to construct psychometric curves. The curves allowed us to measure the subjects' JNDs and to verify that they used a consistent prior across the estimation and 2AFC trials.
Experimental details
Subjects performed the experiment over five days, participating approximately two hours per day.
On each day they were seated in front of a computer monitor (approximately 24 inches (52cm wide, 32.5cm high) in a quiet room. Each day subjects performed two 1000-trial blocks (for a total of 10,000 trials across 5 days). The prior over coin locations switched from block to block, from wide to narrow on one day, and narrow to wide, on the subsequent day, etc. Both priors were normally distributed with mean at the center of the screen. The narrow prior had a standard deviation of 4% screen width while the wide prior had a standard deviation of 20% of screen width. To create the splashes, we sampled 5 dots from a Gaussian distribution centered on the hidden coin's location using distributions with two standard deviations. One with a standard deviation of 2.24% of the screen width, and the other with 8%. These dots were resampled whenever their actual standard deviation (standard deviation of the likelihood) differed from the defined value by more than 10%.
Occasionally, coins close to the left and right side of the monitor would have splashes that fell outside the screen limits. In these trials, the splash was resampled until all dots were within the screen limits. Given the generative process of coins and splashes, this was expected to happen less than 1% of the time. In half of the trials, the same likelihood was used for both coins (8%). In the remaining trials, one of the coins' splashes used the 2.24% standard deviation, while the other used the 8% standard deviation.
2AFC trials wherein the two coins had the same likelihood standard deviation were used to measure subjects' JND. 2AFC trials wherein the two coins had different likelihood standard deviations allowed us to verify that subjects used the prior to judge coin locations, and not simply the splash's centroid or a different prior (see below); under the MAP hypothesis, subjects' behavior would be independent of their prior (see Figure 1 and Table 1 ). However, this would also be the case if subjects merely neglected the prior learned in the estimation trials during the 2AFC trials, and instead relied on a different and unchanged prior.
All trials began as described above, with each block consisting of 500 estimation trials and 500
2AFC trials in a random order. To assist subjects in learning the coin's prior quickly, the first half of each block consisted of mostly estimation trials (375 estimation trial and 125 2AFC trials) while the second half was mostly 2AFC trials (125 estimation trials and 375 2AFC trials). After the end of the first block, subjects took a brief (3-5 minute) rest before beginning the second block, with a different prior.
At the start of each day, subjects were instructed on how to complete the estimation and 2AFC tasks, from a prepared manuscript. Subjects were told that someone behind them (the exact location not being important) was tossing coins, one at a time, into the pond/screen. In the estimation trials, their task was to try and "catch" the coin by placing a net (the vertical bar) where they believed the unseen coin landed. They were asked to make the average distance between the net and coin as small as possible, while collecting the maximum number of coins.
They were also informed that they would be paid based in part on how small this distance was.
Though clear to most subjects, it was explained to them that the vertical component of their guess did not matter, as the net spanned the whole height of the screen. For the 2AFC trials they would have to guess which of the unseen coins landed further to the right. Instructions were provided on how to indicate their choice with a key depress. To reduce the influence of uncontrolled cognitive strategies, subjects were also told that the person throwing coins was not trying to help or hinder their progress, nor reacting to the choices they made.
At the end of each day, their average distance from the hidden coins during the estimation trials was tallied and they were paid a base rate plus an additional bonus for increasingly small average errors.
Data Analysis
Estimation task Independent of the decision-making strategy (sampling or MAP), our analysis assumes that subjects form beliefs by optimally combining priors and likelihoods. The combination of these two pieces of information gives rise to the well-known linear weighting of prior expectations and evidence (see Kording and Wolpert, 2004) :
whereŝ is the estimated coin location, c is the cue, µ is the mean of the prior, and r reliance is the relative reliance on the likelihood, defined as σ 2 prior /(σ 2 sensory + σ 2 prior ). Intuitively, if the sensory information (likelihood) is very important relative to the prior (i.e., σ sensory σ prior ) then r reliance ≈ 1 and the expected stimulus position would be at the center of the sensory feedback/cue location.
Similarly, if the prior is very important relative to sensory feedback (i.e., σ sensory σ prior ) then r reliance ≈ 0 and the estimated stimulus position would be at the prior's mean. The reliance on the likelihood is an indirect measurement of the variance of a subject's prior (Kording and Wolpert, 2004; Berniker et al., 2010; Vilares et al., 2012) .
Our estimation experiment collects a set of experimentally defined cues, c, and the respective subjects' estimation of the stimulus position s. By using ordinary least squares estimation, it is possible to estimate r reliance without bias (Hastie, 2009) . Similarly, we can manipulate Equation 23 to obtain the mean of the prior.
Estimating PSE and JND from psychometric data We use a psychometric function (the cumulative Gaussian function) that matched the theoretical framework used in this study. In this way, we can directly compare the estimated quantities of our fits with the predicted quantities of the theoretical decision-making mechanisms. We model the probability of a decision as
where δ is the discrepancy between stimuli and z is the decision of the subject. We find the values of PSE and σ JND by a maximum likelihood estimation algorithm.
The psychometric function in Equation 24 assumes that subjects make no distraction mistakes;
given a sufficiently large discrepancy between the stimuli, the cumulative Gaussian converges on both sides to a 100% discrimination rate. However, to account for occasional mistakes that subjects may produce, we add a lapse parameter that can be interpreted as a small but non negligible chance that subjects commit errors and respond randomly, independent of the discrepancy, with λ probability. The psychometric curve can be then modified to accommodate this change as follows
We find the parameters jointly by maximum likelihood optimization. Every psychometric curve used in this study was adapted this way to include a lapse. For estimating, for each subject, the slope of PSE, JND, reliance in feedback and mean of the prior, we dropped the first 500 trials for the first day and the first 100 trials for all other days. Confidence intervals and standard errors were computed using 1000 bootstrap samples. Unless otherwise specified, all t-tests were two-sided and significance level was set to 0.05.
Results
Although the 2AFC task is well studied, exactly which decision-making mechanism the brain uses to complete this task is not clear. For two popular classes of decision-making mechanisms, we mathematically derived the predicted psychometric curve and the influence of the prior on the JND. We then measured the actual JND while we manipulated subjects' priors in a behavioral 2AFC experiment. A comparison of the predictions with the experimental data was then used to 
Decision-making mechanisms and the JND predictions
One of the central measures obtained from a psychometric curve is the just-noticeable difference (JND), which quantifies how different two stimuli must be for subjects to reliably report them as distinct. Importantly, the JND is thought to be independent of individual's subjective beliefs or biases (Green, 1966) . As a result, the JND is assumed to be a valuable measure of a subject's sensory precision, regardless of what neural mechanisms are used to make decisions. We found that depending on how the brain makes decisions the JND can have very different interpretations, calling into question traditional experimental findings.
One prominent hypothesis for decision-making is the maximum a posteriori (MAP) mechanism (Green, 1966) . Under this hypothesis, subjects make their choice by comparing the most probable values of the two stimuli ( Figure 1A) . If the brain uses this mechanism, the resulting psychometric curve and JND are independent of a subject's prior (see Figure 1B , C). Under this condition the experimentally derived JND is directly related to a subject's sensory noise (see 1). Most studies that use the 2AFC to measure sensory precision implicitly assume the MAP mechanism. Again, if this assumption is true, then the prior has no influence on the JND, making the approach particularly attractive. Alternative decision-making mechanisms, however, predict distinct results.
Another prominent hypothesis for decision-making is the so-called sampling mechanism (Hoyer and Hyvarinen, 2003; Ackley et al., 1985; Fiser et al., 2010) . Under this hypothesis, choices are made using approximations to the most probable stimulus values ( Figure 1A ). These approximations are computed by averaging k "sample" values drawn from each belief distribution (see Methods).
If the brain uses this mechanism, the JND does not measure sensory precision. Rather, the JND is influenced by sensory noise and prior beliefs (see Figure 1B , C and Table 1 ). We also note the (500ms) were interleaved in the presentation of splashes. Subjects were then randomly presented with one of two tasks: the estimation/coin-catching task (B) or the 2AFC task (C). B) In the estimation task subjects were prompted to place a net (vertical blue bar) where they believed the second hidden coin fell. C) In the 2AFC task subjects had to report which of the two hidden coins landed more to the right.
special case where k = 1 (Table 1) , which is the so-called matching hypothesis (Wozny et al., 2010; Vulkan, 2000; Myers, 1976; Estes, 1950) .
The above results are in stark contrast with the traditional interpretation of the 2AFC task. We find that when a subject's prior is certain (relatively small σ prior ), the JND increases (see Figure   1C ). Intuitively, we can interpret this as follows: as the prior becomes more and more certain, sensory information becomes less relevant and distinguishing a difference between the two stimuli requires increasingly large differences. By investigating multiple variations of these decision-making hypotheses, we can derive a corresponding interpretation of the experimental JND. In the next section we present results from an experiment that exploits these differing interpretations.
Estimation trials measure subjective beliefs
Across five days, subjects performed in two kinds of randomly interleaved trials (see Materials and Methods). In the estimation trials subjects estimated the location of a hidden coin. In the 2AFC trials subject had to decide which of two coins was further to the right. To guess the coins' locations, subjects were shown "splashes" (a likelihood) indicating where the coin landed (see Figure   2 ). Half the trials had a wide splash (providing poor evidence) and half the trials had a narrow splash. Similarly, the hidden coins were drawn from two distributions (the priors): one wide, the other narrow. Thus on each day subjects were exposed to four conditions, hidden coins drawn from two priors (wide or narrow, 'WP' or 'NP') with two likelihoods ('WL', or 'NL'), abbreviated as WP-WL, WP-NL, NP-WL, and NP-NL. Using these four conditions, we could monitor a subject's subjective prior while simultaneously measuring their JND . By combining these results, we could quantify the relation between prior uncertainty and JND.
During the estimation trials we measured two important variables: the mean of their prior and the linear relationship between splash and subject's estimated coin location, which we refer to as the reliance on the likelihood (relative to the prior). The reliance on the likelihood is an indirect measurement of the variance of a subject's prior (Kording and Wolpert, 2004; Berniker et al., 2010; Vilares et al., 2012) . With these variables we could monitor both mean and variance of each subject's subjective prior.
The true mean of the hidden coins' experimentally defined prior, the middle of the screen, was the same for each day and condition. Typical subject means were very accurate and not significantly different from the correct mean, t(135) = 1.04, p = 0.3 (see Figure 3B for example subject). Pooling each subject's data across days, we found differences across subjects, F(6, 18) = 3.26, p = 0.02, but not conditions, F(3, 18) = 0.06, p = 0.97 (two-way ANOVA). This suggested that overall the subjects learned the correct, condition-independent, experimentally defined mean.
For subjects to accurately estimate the hidden coin's location, they required an accurate estimate of the prior's variability. Therefore we examined the reliance on the likelihood (see Figure 3C for example subject). Using only the first 250 trials of the first day, we found significant differences across experimental priors (F(1, 19) = 108.1, p < 0.01), and likelihoods (F(1, 19) = 21.74, p < 0.01),
but not subjects (F(1, 19) = 0.874, p = 0.53). This suggested that all subjects reacted to the four conditions early on, and did so similarly. Examining the reliance on the likelihood across 250-trial bins for the first day, we found that the distance from the optimal slope significantly diminished for the NP-WL condition (t(26) = −2.44, p one-sided = 0.01), but not for the other conditions (NP-WL, t(26) = 2.51, p one-sided = 0.99, WP-NL, t(26) = −1.37, p one-sided = 0.09, WP-WL, t(26) = −0.78, p one-sided = 0.22). Overall, these results suggest that subjects' behavior converged quickly and no significant learning was observable even during the first day.
The above analyses determined that subjects learned quickly within the first day, but we also wished to know if their behavior changed across days. Examining the last 250 trials of each day, we found significant differences across priors (F(1, 123) = 324.8, p < 0.01), likelihoods (F(1, 123) = 91.1, p < 0.01) and subjects (F(6, 123) = 4.42, p < 0.01), but not across days (F(4, 123) = 1.43, p = 0.22). Therefore, subjects' overall responses did differ, but these differences were dominated by the changes across prior and likelihood conditions. Pooling the data across subjects and days, the overall reliance on likelihood were are as follows (mean ± We note here that on the whole, both within and across subjects, these numbers are all statistically distinct from the theoretical optimum. Regardless, we are able to precisely characterize each subject's prior. Furthermore, our analysis demonstrated that across conditions, the subjects had stable priors across days.
We conclude that subjects take into consideration the prior and the likelihood uncertainty when making a decision in the estimation task. Importantly, they learn a different prior for each imposed distribution of coins, and we were able to measure this subjective belief. This will allow us to examine whether or not changes in subjects' priors influenced their JNDs, a critical test for distinguishing the MAP and sampling hypotheses.
2AFC trials quantify psychometric functions
During the 2AFC trials, subjects were shown two splashes and asked to guess which coin landed further to the right. As should be expected, the decision probabilities systematically varied with the disparity of the evidence (see Figure 4) -the larger the distance between the two stimuli, the more certain the answer. From this data we can fit a psychometric curve and extract two important variables: the point of subjective equality (PSE), and the JND. Again, this information is needed to test which decision-making mechanism the brain uses.
If subjects were biased, e.g. believing the second coin usually landed further to the right, the PSE would quantify it. To test this, we estimated PSEs for each subject, condition, and day. We found that there was no significant bias in the PSE (t(67) = 1.71, p = 0.091, averaged across subjects, days and conditions). By performing a three-way ANOVA, we found that there were no significant differences in PSE across priors (F(1, 56) = 1.74, p = 0.19), days (F(4, 56) = 0.45, p = 0.73), or : JND across days and two conditions. A) Example data from a typical subject for two conditions and the resulting psychometric curves. The response probability indicates the proportion of trials that subjects reported the second coin as being further to the right. Red and blue dots are subject responses during the narrow and wide prior conditions, respectively. Note that the probability of subjective equality, or PSE, is very close to zero; the subject did not have a bias in coin locations. Also note that the curves are very similar, and thus have similar JNDs. B) JNDs for each subject across days and two conditions (mean ± SEM).
subjects (F(6, 56) = 2.25, p = 0.05). Overall, these results suggest that subjects did not have strong biases in their decisions.
Next we measured the JNDs. The average JND was 0.086 ± 0.003 screen units (across subjects, days, and conditions); i.e. subjects could reliably discriminate two coin splashes when they varied by roughly 8% of the screen, or 4.5 centimeters. A three-way ANOVA revealed that there were no significant differences in JNDs across subjects (F(6, 56) = 1.38, p = 0.23) or days (F(4.56) = 1.27, p = 0.28). There were significant differences across priors (F(1, 56) = 34.3, p < 0.001), and the measured JNDs were larger in the wide prior condition (WP-WL, the data from the WP-NL trials is used in the subsequent section's analysis). This suggests that subjects were self-consistent across days, but the prior did have some influence.
In summary, we were able to accurately measure individual JNDs and PSEs, across conditions and days. We found that none of these estimates changed across days, a fact that we use later to pool data and test the relationship between reliance on the likelihood and a subjects' JND.
Subjects use the learned prior during the 2AFC task
A basic assumption of the 2AFC analysis is that subjects use their prior when making choices.
While it was clear subjects were relying on their prior during the estimation trials, subjects may Example data (black dots) from a typical subject is shown with its fit. B) These surfaces are used to obtain how the PSE changes with cue locations. The across-days average slope of the PSE is shown for each subject. The slopes are significantly different across conditions, demonstrating that subjects did not merely use the splash centroids to make a decision.
have been using a different strategy during the 2AFC trials. For example, subjects might simply use the centroids to choose between splashes (i.e. a maximum-likelihood estimate), and neglect their prior all together. To eliminate this possibility, we examined the 2AFC trials where the two coins had different splash sizes (WL and NL conditions). In such cases, the probability of a response is a function of both cue locations (not merely the difference between them); the psychometric function is now a surface (see Figure 5A and Equation 22 in Methods). If subjects use their prior, both sampling and MAP models predict that the PSE changes as a function of cue locations. Thus these trials served as a control to establish that the prior was actually used in the 2AFC trials.
In agreement with the models, we found that the linear relationship between PSEs and cue locations changed with the condition's prior. The PSE's linear relationship for the narrow prior condition was significantly smaller than that of the wide prior conditions within subjects (paired t-test t(6) = −2.35, p = 0.028, Figure 5B ). As predicted, subjects use the prior during the 2AFC task, confirming that the priors we measured during the estimation trials were those used in the 2AFC trials. S7: t(6) = 1.6, p one-sided = 0.92, Figure 6A ). We performed the same analysis across subjects after pooling data across days. Again, we found that the data did not follow a negative trend, and there was no significant decrease in JNDs (t(12) = 1.497, p one-sided = 0.919, Figure 6B ). Collectively these results provide no evidence of the JND dependence on priors predicted by sampling.
To assess the overall ability of the MAP and sampling models to describe the subjects' behavior, we again pooled data across days. For each model, we assumed that the across-subject sensory noise (likelihood variance) was a free parameter. This is a sensible assumption since the subjects' perception of the stimuli can only introduce further noise above and beyond that introduced by the the experiment. The more the noise in the sensory perception, the flatter the psychometric curve and the larger the JND. The sampling model had the additional free parameter, k, the sample size.
Both model parameters were fit using the subject averages ( Figure 6B , dotted and dashed lines).
The fitted sensory noises for the MAP and sampling models were 35% and 31% larger than the true experimental standard deviation (0.05 screen units), respectively. This should be expected, since the inherent noise in the visual system can only increase the uncertainty in the experimental stimuli. For the sampling model, the best fit for k was 24 (CI 95% = [5, 222], bootstrapped across subjects and conditions). The sampling model's large k effectively approximated the MAP model. A quantitative comparison of the two models accounting for the difference in free parameters strongly favored the MAP model over the sampling model (BIC = -62.6, -47.4, respectively). As a further analysis, we also fit the two models to each individual subject. Here again the results favored the MAP over sampling when comparing BIC (t paired (6) = −18.61, p < 0.001).
For multiple subjects the measured JNDs increased with the reliance on the likelihood, a finding not predicted by either mechanism. Therefore we performed a secondary, more conservative analysis Figure 6: Comparing subject data and candidate decision-making theories. A) Each subject's measured JND plotted versus the reliance on the likelihood for each day (boot-strapped means). The grey dashed lines are the best linear fit to the change in JND across the reliance on the likelihood. Overlaid on each plot are the optimal MAP and sampling (for k = 1,2 and 3) predictions. B) Each subject's across-days averages are displayed. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals over the JND and the reliance on the likelihood. Dotted and dashed black lines display the best MAP and sampling (k=24) models fit to all data, respectively. that would not be affected by this effect. Using only on the data obtained during the narrow prior condition (left-most in Figure 6B ). Every subjects' average JND lies below the matching prediction (t(6) = −8.3, p < 0.001), which means that their decision's precision was better than that possible with matching. That is, even if subjects had perfect visual acuity (i.e. their likelihood was equivalent to that experimentally imposed), this data rules out the matching mechanism. Similarly, we find sampling with k = 2 unlikely (t(6) = −3.9, p = 0.006). Matching as well as sampling with small k seems incompatible with the data from this condition.
Discussion
The 2AFC paradigm is the technique of choice used to measure sensory uncertainty, widely interpreted to be independent of subjective priors. Here we have demonstrated that this interpretation depends crucially on how the brain makes decisions. By mathematically deriving the psychometric curves under two prominent decision-making mechanisms, MAP and sampling, we predicted how a subject's prior would influence the experimentally obtained JND. To test these predictions we set up a visual task where subjects either estimated, or compared the locations of, two stimuli. Our results strongly favor a MAP mechanism over sampling, supporting the common assumption that JND's quantify sensory precision. Furthermore, we establish the 2AFC paradigm as a psychophysics tool for probing how the brain makes decisions.
While our results do not support sampling, we note that the two mechanisms become indistinguishable as the number of samples grows; that is, sampling with large k will always appear like MAP. Our analysis shows that if subjects were sampling, they did so with a good number of samples. Limiting the stimulus exposure may limit the number of samples subjects can acquire.
Sampling time was limited by the presentation of a visual mask that followed the stimulus after just 25ms. It would thus seem that subjects, if they do sample, do so extremely rapidly. Future studies can address alternative techniques to limit the potential number of samples in an effort to find further evidence for sampling. Regardless of the techniques employed, if the brain is making decisions with a large number of samples, distinguishing between MAP and sampling at the behavioral level will always remain a fundamental challenge.
An interesting finding was that not only do subject JNDs not decrease with increasing reliance on likelihood, but they actually increased. This was a finding neither decision-making mechanism predicted. We can speculate that a subject's likelihood may not be constant, but depend on many parameters, e.g. the proportion of the screen subjects need to attend to, or the size of the experimentally imposed noise, the prior distribution of hidden coins, or a subject's motivation, or some combination of them. Sources of uncertainty such as these would lead to increases in subject's uncertainty and measured JND's, without influencing the PSE, just as we've found. Regardless, precisely what caused this effect could be the subject of future studies.
At the behavioral level, there are theoretical and experimental studies that argue for samplingbased decisions. Research in decision-making has demonstrated that the sampling mechanism is optimal under some circumstances, e.g. when one believes that the statistics of the environment are non-stationary, or while the subject is actively learning (Sakai and Fukai, 2008b,a; Vul et al., 2009) . At the same time, work in cognitive (Gaissmaier and Schooler, 2008) and perceptual tasks (Wozny et al., 2010; Battaglia et al., 2011) has found experimental evidence for sampling. These studies, however, employ tasks requiring multi-sensory cue combination and reinforcement learning, making them difficult to compare with ours. Nevertheless, we can speculate that the added steps in multi-modal sensory integration and cognitive load could contribute to significant changes in decision-making strategies. Even more, sampling can be implemented in a number of ways. Yet we found that two prominent approaches are indistinguishable behaviorally (see Appendix). Future work can address why some tasks appear to exhibit a sampling mechanism, whereas our 2AFC task favors a MAP mechanism. Similarly, at the neural level, there are many theoretical and experimental studies suggesting that neurons encode information by sampling. Under these theories, spikes or firing rates, from neurons or pools of neurons, encode samples from the posterior distribution (Ackley et al., 1985; Hoyer and Hyvarinen, 2003; Fiser et al., 2010; Beck et al., 2012; Shadlen and Kiani, 2013) . Consistent with these ideas, electrophysiological evidence of spontaneous neural activity has also been argued to support sampling (Berkes et al., 2011 but see Okun et al., 2012 . However, this evidence, from an observational study, lacks controlled manipulations of uncertainty and merits further work. Further studies will determine the degree to which sampling can help explain neural data. The data we present here is compatible with subjects sampling extremely rapidly. Neural data could be used to test this prediction.
There are also many reasons why the finding of a MAP mechanism is not surprising. Just as sampling is optimal under some circumstances, MAP too, is optimal under other circumstances
